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ABSTRACT: Polysemous concepts with multiple related meanings pervade natural languages, 
yet some philosophers argue that we should eliminate them to avoid miscommunication and 
pointless debates in scientific discourse. This paper defends the legitimacy of polysemous con-
cepts in science against this eliminativist challenge. My approach analyses such concepts as 
patchworks with multiple scale-dependent, technique-involving, domain-specific and property-
targeting uses (patches). I demonstrate the generality of my approach by applying it to "hard-
ness" in materials science, "homology" in evolutionary biology, "gold" in chemistry and "cor-
tical column" in neuroscience. Such patchwork concepts are legitimate if the techniques used 
to apply them produce reliable results, the domains to which they are applied are homogenous, 
and the properties they refer to are significant to describe, classify or explain the behavior of 
entities in the extension of the concept. By following these normative constraints, researchers 
can avoid miscommunication and pointless debates without having to eliminate polysemous 
patchwork concepts in scientific discourse. 
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There is a growing consensus in philosophy (of science) that we should not expect that (scien-
tific) concepts can be analysed as a set of properties that are individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions of application (Taylor and Vickers [2017]). We learned this lesson in part 
because during scientific growth and development, scientists routinely migrate concepts and 
allow them to change, often imperceptibly at first (Wilson [2006]).  An adequate account of 
scientific concepts should recognize that there is a necessary kind of flexibility and looseness 
in how concepts are deployed and develop in scientific thought. Yet scientific concepts with 
too much slack cease to function as such: they invite equivocation where we wanted clarity of 
understanding.  
This paper focuses on polysemy as a legitimate and indeed necessary kind of looseness 
in scientific language and provides a general approach to explain how scientists can use poly-
semous concepts rigorously and without equivocation. Polysemous concepts are words which 
have multiple meanings that are related to each other (Vicente [2017]). Polysemy is a pervasive 
feature of natural languages, yet linguists observe that it typically does not pose problems in 
everyday communication (Taylor [2003], Falkum [2015]). What is rarely discussed in linguis-
tics are cases of scientific polysemy like the following:  
(1) The temperature of a gas increases when its volume is compressed.  
(2) The temperature of a rubber band increases when its diameter is expanded.  
For (1), equilibrium thermodynamics defines “temperature” as “mean molecular kinetic en-
ergy”. This definition cannot be extended to (2), however, because rubber bands are not in 
molecular thermodynamic equilibrium. They reach this state only after dissolving into molec-
ular polymer soup over hundreds of years. Yet rubber bands display the higher-scale property 
of frozen order of polymer chains, which determines their ability to move freely. When the 
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rubber band is expanded, the polymer chains have fewer degrees of freedom to wiggle around 
than in the relaxed state, which increases the temperature of the rubber band.  
So-called ‘patchwork approaches’ account for this kind of polysemy by claiming that 
scientists often systematically employ the same term in different ways, each of which depends 
on the length scale of investigation, what technique is involved, the specific domain of appli-
cation and which property scientists target. For example: in the domain of gases, “temperature” 
involves equations from kinetic gas theory and targets the property mean kinetic energy at the 
molecular scale, whereas in the domain of solids, “temperature” involves restricted ensemble 
techniques and targets frozen order at the polymer scale (Wilson [2017], p. 188). Following 
pluralists, patchwork approaches assume that words with different scale-dependent, technique-
involving, domain-specific and property-targeting uses (‘patches’) have multiple, equally legit-
imate meanings (Stanford and Kitcher [2000], Brigandt [2010], Hochstein [2016]).  
Patchwork approaches combine elements of internalist and externalist semantics to de-
scribe how polysemy arises when researchers extend their concepts to related yet subtly differ-
ent phenomena. Researchers often use the same ‘general reasoning strategy’ when extending a 
concept to novel cases (internalist element, section 2.1). Such extensions can lead to initially 
unnoticed changes in how the concept is used, because the hidden hand of nature silently shifted 
its reference to a novel property (externalist element, sections 2.2 and 3.3). This reference shift 
requires scientists to update their ‘semantic picture’, a generic representation of how a repre-
sentational device (linguistic term, diagram, equation etc.) correlates with the world (Wilson 
[2006], 516, section 4.1). Patchwork approaches are defended via detailed case studies, for ex-
ample “hardness” and “force” in physics (Wilson [2006], [2017]), “homology” and “species” 
in biology (Novick [2018], Novick and Doolittle [2021]), “gold” in chemistry (Bursten [2018]) 




[2020], Burnston and Haueis [2021]).1 Echoing the linguistics literature, these case studies sug-
gest that polysemous concepts are a pervasive feature of scientific language which enables suc-
cessful communication.  
In contrast to patchwork approaches, eliminativists call the legitimacy of polysemous sci-
entific concepts into question (Ereshefsky [1992], Machery [2010]). Eliminativists pose a nor-
mative challenge to patchwork approaches: even if concepts with multiple related meanings 
exist in scientific practice, we should eliminate them if they lead to miscommunication and 
pointless debate in scientific (or philosophical) discourse (Taylor and Vickers [2017]). Existing 
case studies only justify why scientists do not eliminate a particular concept after it has devel-
oped into a patchwork. But the case studies do not provide a general answer why legitimate 
patchwork concepts should not be eliminated. To move beyond case-by-case justification, a 
general answer to the eliminativist challenge requires normative constraints for evaluating the 
legitimacy of patchwork concepts. When have scientists extended a concept legitimately be-
cause it characterizes phenomena that are related in epistemically significant ways? And when 
does extending an existing concept to a novel phenomenon fail to foster our descriptive, classi-
ficatory or explanatory goals, such that the formation of a new concept becomes necessary? 
 I answer these questions by developing a generalized patchwork approach which pro-
vides normative constraints for legitimate patchwork concepts. I first motivate why we need a 
separate approach for polysemy in the sciences (section 2.1). I then suggest a general format to 
model multiple meanings of a scientific term as patches of a patchwork concept, and apply this 
format to “hardness”, “homology”, “cortical column” and “gold” (section 2.2). The general 
format reveals three ways in which extending a patch to novel cases can fail: when the technique 
used to apply it becomes unreliable (section 3.1), when the domain to which it is applied 
 
1 Further cases—though not explicitly couched in patchwork terms so far—include “acid” (Kitcher and Stanford 
[2000]), “gene” (Brigandt [2010]) and “water” (Havstadt [2018]). See also the list in Taylor and Vickers ([2017]). 
A Generalized Patchwork Approach 
5 
 
becomes heterogenous (section 3.2), or when the property it targets becomes insignificant for 
reaching epistemic goals (section 3.3). If such failures persist and accumulate over time, ex-
tending a patch becomes illegitimate and scientists should form a novel concept instead (section 
3.4). Putting the failures together reveals normative constraints that scientists follow to use in-
dividual patches rigorously, and to relate patches to each other without equivocation (section 
4.1). I use these normative constraints to defend the legitimacy of scientific patchwork concepts 
against the eliminativist challenge (section 4.2). My defense reveals that legitimate patchwork 
concepts have a pragmatic form of unity overlooked by eliminativist accounts. Section 5 con-
cludes. 
2 The Patchwork Structure of Scientific Concepts 
2.1 Patchwork concepts and polysemy 
Polysemous words acquire multiple related meanings when speakers extend them to novel 
cases. This process is a feature of the flexibility of language, not a bug of defective concepts. 
Polysemy rarely poses a problem for successful everyday communication since speakers are 
generally able to decode the relevant meaning from a conversational context (Falkum [2015]). 
Similarly, I argue that the patchwork structure of scientific concepts rarely poses a problem for 
scientific communication. The specific investigative context usually allows researchers to select 
the relevant subset of information from the overall content of the polysemous concept (Wilson 
[2017], ch. 1; section 4.2).  
There are two important differences between everyday polysemy and scientific patch-
work concepts. First, everyday polysemy usually occurs at the level of lexical word meaning. 
Consequently, linguists model how speakers decode the contextually appropriate meaning from 
a single sentence (Falkum [2015], Vicente [2017]). By contrast, patchwork structures arise 




356; [2017], p. 25, p. 226). A general reasoning strategy consists of stepwise instructions which 
can be realized by different experimental or modeling techniques (section 2.2), and which pro-
vide a pragmatic unity to the different uses of a patchwork concept (section 4.2). Patchwork 
approaches describe how extending a reasoning strategy changes the meaning of concept be-
cause it encodes a novel subset of information about the behavior of a class of entities. For 
example: the thermodynamic reasoning strategy of “temperature” instructs researchers to (a) 
find the energetic equilibrium state of a system and (b) calculate how increases in kinetic energy 
relate to decreases in degrees of freedom. Extending this strategy from gases to solids shifts the 
meaning of “temperature”: it encodes information about mean kinetic energy of molecules in 
the former and information about to the frozen order of polymer chains in the latter. 
Second, many polysemous words in everyday language possess a core meaning. For ex-
ample: the core meaning of “mouth” is “oral cavity of animals”, and all its other meanings are 
related to this meaning (Vicente [2017], p. 19). By contrast, patchwork approaches hold that 
many scientific concepts have a semantic structure that is analogous to the material structure of 
a quilt. Each patch in a quilt is stitched to neighboring patches, but there is no central piece to 
which all patches are connected. Analogously, patchwork concepts have different scale-de-
pendent, technique-involving, domain-specific and property-targeting uses (patches) that are 
related locally to one another. But at least in all cases examined so far, patchwork concepts lack 
a core meaning to which all uses are related. 
This point holds no matter which linguistic model of polysemy we adopt (see Vicente 
[2017], p. 6). Patchwork concepts lack a privileged meaning from which all others can be de-
rived (literalist model), a total meaning from which word uses recruit a limited set of features 
(overspecification model) or an abstract and general summary representation, which encom-
passes and gives access to all its meanings (underspecification model). Consider first literalism. 
Sometimes physicists suggest that “mean molecular kinetic energy” represents the privileged 
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meaning of “temperature” (Tadmor and Miller [2012], p. 554). But that would misidentify the 
meaning which has been diagnosed initially as the most significant one (Wilson [2017], p. 192). 
Physicists now recognize that “mean molecular kinetic energy” is most informative for gases, 
whereas “frozen order of polymer chains” is most informative for solids. Neither domain-spe-
cific use represents the privileged meaning of “temperature”. 
Concerning the overspecification model, consider how researchers use different tests to 
apply “hardness” to different classes of material: 
 
Fig. 1. Simplified model of the patchwork structure of “hardness”, 
based on Wilson ([2006], p. 338). 
 
For metals, indenter tests measure the physical quantity ‘yield strength’ (patch 1, Fig. 1), 
whereas for elastomers, durometer tests measure ‘Young’s modulus of elasticity’ (patch 2, Fig. 
1). The meaning of “hardness” is derived from such tests because there is no theory that unifies 
all uses of “hardness”, and the theoretical accounts which do exist are often unreliable to cal-
culate trustworthy hardness values in engineering contexts (Wilson [2006], p. 341; Arnell 
[2010], p. 60).  Nevertheless, indenter and durometer tests suggest that the total meaning of 
hardness is “resistance to deformation of three-dimensional shape”. Each test recruits a limited 




and green lines below patch 1 and 2). However, this is only a local relation, because other tests 
measure physical quantities that resemble, but are not identical to three-dimensional shape de-
formation. In metals and technical ceramics, abrasion tests measure asperity, i.e. surface rough-
ness (yellow line below patch 3). Asperity determines the ‘wear rate’ of a material when another 
material is slid across its surface. Because the same material can behave differently when 
abraded or indented, multiple conflicting hardness values arise from different tests (“multi-val-
uedness” in Fig. 1, see Wilson [2006], p. 338; Pérez Carballo [2020], p. 22f.). It is partly be-
cause of these conflicts that material scientists deny that hardness is a fundamental property 
(Newey and Weaver [2013], p. 13). Yield strength, elasticity and wear rate are three distinct 
properties which all objects in the extension of “hardness” possess. Each property is primarily 
significant for generating knowledge about the behavior of restricted classes of material (with 
important overlaps, section 4.1). But they are not features of a common property which specifies 
the total meaning of “hardness”. 
Because of the domain-specific epistemic significance of properties, patchwork concepts 
lack a privileged or a total meaning to which all uses are related. Yet, the general reasoning 
strategy of a patchwork concept seems to provide an underspecified core meaning. For exam-
ple: the general reasoning strategy of “hardness” instructs researchers to (a) perform a mechan-
ical intervention on a material and (b) find a quantity which describes how the material resists 
that intervention. This seems to suggest that “resistance to mechanical intervention” is a general 
and abstract summary representation which encompasses and gives access to all meanings of 
“hardness”. The underspecification model certainly comes closest to describe polysemous con-
cepts in science. Yet it fails to capture that the primary role of general reasoning strategies is 
instructive: they tell researchers what operations they need to undertake to reach an epistemic 
goal. Accordingly, the general reasoning strategy of “hardness” does not determine what this 
concept refers to. Rather it instructs researchers how to determine properties that are significant 
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to describe material behavior for engineering purposes. General reasoning strategies thus re-
semble internalist semantics in which meanings are instructions on how to assemble concepts 
(Pietroski [2018], pp. 24–9). Analogously, a general reasoning strategy provides researchers 
instructions on how to assemble patches of a patchwork concept. These instructions are not 
abstract summary representations to which researchers add features to arrive at the different 
meanings of a polysemous term. The instructions rather constrain which techniques researchers 
can use to discover properties that are epistemically significant, i.e. properties that can be used 
to explain, classify or explain the behavior of entities. Linguistic and semantic theories of pol-
ysemy usually do not highlight this pragmatic and instructive role of general reasoning strate-
gies.   
Another difference to underspecified core meanings is that general reasoning strategies 
constrain but do not encompass all technique-involving uses of the same word. Consider “ho-
mology”:  
 
Fig. 2. A simplified representation of the patchwork structure of “homology”,  
based on Novick ([2018], Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 2 shows the relations between the general reasoning strategy of ‘genealogical homol-
ogy’ (grey rectangle) and scale-dependent, technique-involving, domain-specific and property-
targeting uses of “homology” (green and blue rectangles). Genealogical homology instructs 




common ancestor and (b) form a transformation series during evolution (Novick [2018]). By 
devising techniques which realize this strategy, biologists discovered that two genes are gene-
alogically homologous if they are produced by the gene replication mechanism and are passed 
via vertical descent between two species (“orthology”, Fig. 2). Two body parts are genealogi-
cally homologous if—according to Wagner ([2014])—they are produced by the same gene reg-
ulatory network in two species and transform into one another during evolution (“special ho-
mology”, Fig. 2). The genealogical reasoning strategy integrates two domain-specific uses of 
“homology” (black upwards arrows, Fig. 2).  It does not, however, abstractly represent all same-
ness relations that biologists classify as homologies. Extending the very same techniques to 
novel cases, biologists also discovered genes and body parts that cannot be part of a transfor-
mation series (“paralogy”, “xenology”, “serial homology”, Fig. 2). This example shows that 
while general instructions provide a common thread to some patches, patchwork concepts also 
have local relations which connect these uses to cases which fall outside the general reasoning 
strategy.  
In sum, polysemy in science arises from extending general reasoning strategies rather 
than single words to novel domains, and the resulting patchwork concepts lack a core meaning. 
No single use expresses the privileged meaning of a patchwork concept, even though some are 
historically more prominent than others. There is no total meaning, since frequently there is no 
common property from which techniques measure different features, only related properties 
whose epistemic significance varies by domain. And while reasoning strategies do not ab-
stractly represent all meanings, they integrate several uses, which together with local relations 
provides a pragmatic unity to patchwork concept (section 4.2).  
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2.2 A general format for representing patchwork structure 
 
One may question the legitimacy of polysemous scientific concepts because without a core 
meaning, it is unclear what unites different uses of the same word, and how scientists avoid 
equivocation when a polysemous term is applied to novel cases. The generalized patchwork 
approach answers these worries by providing norms on the level of a patch, which is a scale-
dependent, technique-involving, domain-specific and property-targeting way of using a word. 
Patchwork concepts have multiple meanings because they have multiple patches. I distinguish 
four elements which determine the meaning of a patch: 
“P” S < t, d (θ) > 
The first element of a patch “P” is the scale s. Many scientific concepts describe entities that 
display different properties or behaviors at characteristic length scales. Bursten ([2018]) calls 
such properties or behaviors ‘scale-dependent’ because they are only instantiated by entities at 
a characteristic length scale, and because they are described in scale-specific models of a mul-
tiscale modeling schema (Batterman [2013], Wilson [2017], ch 5., see section 4.1). I will not 
use this element separately to evaluate patches because it is unclear in the above writings when 
a change of scale generates a novel meaning. In the cases below all scale changes co-occur with 
changes of properties (θ). For now, I define s as the minimal spatial, temporal or energetic 
interval at which an entity instantiates a scale-dependent property or behavior.  
The second, operationalist element t specifies an experimental or modeling ‘technique’. 
An experimental technique instructs researchers how to use a measurement or intervention de-
vice to produce a specific experimental result (Colaço [2018]). Modeling techniques instruct 
researchers how to use a mathematical equation to produce a specific kind of numerical result. 
Techniques can realize the general reasoning strategy of a patchwork concept because they 




the strategy provides. Hence scientists attempt to extend a patch to novel cases by applying a 
specific technique which realizes the strategy. Such extensions fail when researchers realize 
that the technique produces unreliable results (section 3.1). While each patch has a technique 
specific to it, a patch is not defined by that technique. In practice researchers use multiple tech-
niques without switching patches (section 4.1) or add novel techniques to the same patch over 
time.  
The third element (domain d) and the fourth element (property θ) resemble externalist 
semantics (see section 3.4). Each patch specifies a class of entities (domain d) and targets a 
property θ, which assigns members of that class to the extension of the concept. For example: 
yield strength (θ) is used to assign members of the class metal to the extension of “hardness”. 
By contrast, Young’s modulus of elasticity (ψ) is used to assign members of the class elastomer 
to “hardness”.2 Each domain is thus akin to a partial extension of a patchwork concept (Field 
[1973], p. 477; Wilson [1982], pp. 551). The number and scope of domains must be discovered 
empirically (Novick [2018], p. 6). Finally, θ can be a physical quantity, a disposition, a mech-
anism, or other objective features of scientific interest. The common epistemic function of prop-
erties is that they can be ‘significant’. A property is significant if researchers can use it to gen-
erate scientific knowledge about the behavior of entities which have that property (section 3.3). 
Let us now apply the format to specify the multiple meanings of “hardness”: 
(1)  “Hardness” Macro < indenter, metals (yield strength) > 
(2)  “Hardness” Macro < durometer, elastomers (Young’s modulus of elasticity) > 
(3)  “Hardness” Macro < dry sand wear test, technical ceramics (wear rate) > 
These patch-specific meanings are distinguished by the technique used to pick out a physical 
quantity that is significant to describe the behavior of a class of materials. The patches are 
 
2 Throughout the paper I use symbols θ and ψ when talking about two different kinds of properties. 
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related because their domains partially overlap and their techniques realize the same general 
reasoning strategy (section 4.1). 
For “homology (Fig. 2), we get five patch-specific meanings: 
(1) “Homology” gene/phylogenetic < phylogenetic tree comparison, orthology (gene replication) > 
(2)  “Homology” gene < phylogenetic tree comparison, paralogy (gene duplication) > 
(3)  “Homology” gene < phylogenetic tree comparison, xenology (horizontal gene transfer) > 
(4)  “Homology” body part/phylogenetic < gene knockout/enhancement, special homology (conserved GRN)   
(5)  “Homology” body part < gene knockout/enhancement, serial homology (re-expressed GRN)> 
“Homology” patches (1)–(3) involve phylogenetic tree comparison, which instructs biologists 
to reconcile a phylogenetic species tree with a gene family tree (Altenhoff, Glover and Des-
simoz [2019]). Gene knockout/enhancement techniques (patches (5)–(6)) instruct researchers 
to inhibit or excite multiple genes to identify the gene regulatory network which produces a 
body part (Wagner [2014]). Each technique picks out genealogical homologs when applied to 
ortholog genes or special homolog body parts, respectively. These entities mark the evolution 
of novel species at a phylogenetic timescale (included in s of patches (1) and (4)). Both tech-
niques can be extended to non-genealogical homologs (patches (2), (3) and (5)). 
Let’s now apply the format to two further examples. Consider first “cortical column”, 
whose reasoning strategy instructs neuroscientists to (a) search for vertical structures and (b) to 
determine whether neurons within these structures have similar functional properties: 
(1) “Hypercolumn” 2-3mm < tangential recordings, V1, V2, MT (sequence regularity) > 
(2) “Column” 0.5mm < vertical/tangential recordings, primary sensory areas (uniform responses) > 
(3) “Minicolumn” 30-80μm < golgi stain, neocortex (vertical connections > horizontal connections) > 
At the microscale “cortical column” picks out minicolumns, cell bands whose vertical, internal 
connections are stronger than their horizontal, external connections (Mountcastle [1997]). Iden-




mesoscale “cortical column” refers to circuits which uniformly respond to the same sensory 
stimulus. At the macroscale, many columns form a ‘hypercolumn’ if their uniform responses 
are sequence regular, they progress in an orderly manner across the cortex (Hubel and Wiesel 
[1977]). Identifying these functional properties involves electrophysiological recording tech-
niques. These scale-dependent and technique-involving uses of “cortical column” are domain-
specific because each of the three properties targeted is found in a restricted set of brain areas.  
Finally, consider the chemical kind term “gold” (Bursten [2018]): 
(1) “Gold” macro< acid test, macroscopic metal objects (chemically inert) > 
(2) “Gold” nano < spatial modulation spectroscopy, metal nanoparticles (LSPR)> 
(3) “Gold” atomic < atomic orbital model, atoms (electronic symmetry) > 
The analysis highlights that scientists classify instances of “gold” by properties that are charac-
teristic for different length scales (Bursten [2018]). Macroscopic gold lumps are chemically 
inert, they will react with almost no other chemical. By contrast, a gold nanoparticle will be 
highly reactive because most atoms lie on the material surface, which enhances the electromag-
netic field around the nanoparticle. This scale-dependent property is called localized surface 
plasmon resonance (LSPR). A gold atom isolated in a vacuum will possess none of these higher-
scale properties but only its characteristic atomic properties. Identifying each of these scale-
dependent properties involves specific experimental or modeling techniques (Ebbs [2003], 
Muskens et al. [2008], Milton et al. [2011]).   
The case of “gold” raises the question whether all the examples of patchwork concepts 
are analogous. For instance, different technique-involving uses of “homology” do not presup-
pose the same kind of relation between ancestors at different scales of biological organization. 
By contrast, different technique-involving uses of “gold” presuppose that the samples to which 
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the techniques are applied belong to the same kind of chemical substance.3 According to natural 
kind essentialism, what unites the different uses of “gold” is that all samples of gold possess 
the same atomic property necessarily (Hendry [2006]). If natural kind essentialism about gold 
is true, then “gold” is not analogous to the other examples. If it is false, then “gold” it analogous 
because no essential property unifies the different scale-dependent, technique-involving, do-
main-specific and property-targeting uses of “gold”. Although answering this question is tan-
gential to the discussion below, I do think it depends on there being a property that is equally 
significant to explain the behavior of macroscopic lumps, nanoparticles and isolated atoms of 
gold (sections 3.3 and 5). In any case, the general format reveals a conceptually copious use of 
“gold” in chemistry that is similar to other chemical kind concepts, like “acid” (Stanford and 
Kitcher [2000]) or “water” (Wilson [2006], p. 428; Havstadt [2018], pp. 725–8).  
In sum, the general format introduces four elements that determine the patch-specific 
meanings of a patchwork concept: scale, technique, domain and property. Patchwork concepts 
have multiple meanings because each patch involves a different technique, which scientists 
apply to a specific domain of entities to target a particular scale-dependent property. Taylor and 
Vickers ([2017]) speak of ‘fragments’ and ‘fragmentation’, highlighting that different meanings 
of a polysemous concept play different theoretical roles. This terminology conceals, however, 
that polysemous concepts often only fulfil these roles because their meanings are systematically 
related to each another (Pérez Carballo [2020], p. 24). I highlight this fact by defining the patch-
work structure of a concept as the sum of its patches plus their relations to one another. In a 
legitimate patchwork concept, these relations help scientists to achieve descriptive, classifica-
tory explanatory goals (section 4.1). To determine the legitimacy of patchwork concepts, I now 
use the general format to examine various failures which can occur when researchers extend 
patches beyond their proper boundaries. 
 




3 How Patches Can Break: Three Kinds of Failure 
3.1 Unreliable techniques 
The first way in which extending a patch can fail is when the technique it involves permanently 
and systematically produces unreliable results. Techniques can be reliable or unreliable because 
scientists frequently use techniques without knowing exactly which property they characterize 
(Feest [2010], [2011]).  A technique t is reliable if it can detect the same property θ in entity e1 
and entity e2. Consequently, t is unreliable if using it fails to detect the same θ in e1 and e2. This 
failure must occur not only temporarily but permanently: it occurs across multiple repeated uses 
of t. Failure also must be systematic: it is caused by the design of t and not by random interven-
ing factors. One can similarly model the reliability of modeling techniques by substituting “de-
tect” with “calculate” and explicate systematic failure as a failure of the modeling assumptions 
being met by the target system (for examples, see Wilson [2006] pp. 213–22, pp. 320–1; 
[2017]), pp. 215–9). Such reliability failures are crucial to determine the proper application 
range of a technique. 
Consider first the reliability of the indenter hardness test. When applied to a steel bar and 
a brass plate, the test reliably detects yield strength because both deform plastically. The same 
amount of deformation requires applying a larger force to steel than to brass, from which sci-
entists correctly infer that steel is harder than brass. By contrast, indenters fail to reliably detect 
yield strength in a rubber ball because its surface will not plastically deform but recover elas-
tically. This failure is permanent because elastic behavior persists across trials, and it is system-
atic because indenter tests are not designed for elastic surfaces. Materials which are too elastic 
(or too brittle) lie outside the proper application range of indenter tests. Applying indenter tests 
to such materials presents an inadequate stretch of patch (1) of “hardness”. Such an extension 
would mistakenly suggest that rubber balls are harder than steel bars (because they show less 
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plastic deformation), whereas the proper conclusion should be that rubbers are “hard” in a re-
lated but different sense. 
Consider next gene knockout/enhancement techniques. According to Wagner ([2014]), 
they reliably identify body part homology if they detect the same ‘character identity network’. 
If knockout/enhancement of network genes inhibits/activates the production of a body part, then 
biologists can infer a character identity network which is either conserved to produce the same 
body part across species (Oppenheimer et al. [1999]) or re-expressed in the same organism to 
produce serial homology (Hu et al. [2019]). Now, consider extending this technique from whole 
gene networks to single ortholog genes, for example ey in drosophila Pax6 in vertebrates. Both 
genes are necessary for normal eye development, and Pax6 and ey knockout organisms fail to 
develop eyes (Wagner [2014], 107f.). This suggests that vertebrate and insect eyes are special 
homologues. A complex trait like an eye, however, is not produced by a single gene. To assess 
the functional role of ortholog genes we must situate them in a larger causal context (see Craver 
[2007], 257). That context is the network of genes and proteins with which Pax6 and ey interact, 
and those networks are not identical across species (Wagner [2014], 109). Knocking out/en-
hancing ey and Pax6 fails to reliably identify special homologues because they do not belong 
to a conserved character identity network. This failure is systematic because knockout/enhance-
ment techniques detect the effect of genes on an entire gene network mechanism. It is permanent 
because species differences between gene networks will occur repeatedly across experiments. 
The failed application to ey/Pax6 shows biologists that enhancement/knockout techniques 
should be restricted to gene networks underlying body part homology, and that other techniques 
are required to study gene homology (Novick [2018]). 
The two examples illustrate that researchers delineate the boundaries of a patch in part by 
trying to apply a technique to novel cases. Reliability failures reveal that they should not apply 




patchwork structure, researchers thus use multiple techniques, each being restricted to cases 
where it produces reliable results (section 4.1). 
3.2 Heterogenous domains 
The second way in which extending a patch can fail is when its domain contains a heterogenous 
class of entities. A domain d is homogenous if scientists can use the same property θ to assign 
each member in d to the extension of the concept. Which type of property is used to determine 
homogeneity depends on the technique scientists use to study entities in d. Once the property 
type is determined, homogenous domains correspond to real groupings of properties which are 
reflected in the patchwork structure of concepts (Bursten [2018], section 4.1). A domain d is 
heterogenous if for some members of d, researchers use ψ but not θ to assign them to the con-
cept’s extension. Entities are not assigned to d simply because they have θ, but rather because 
θ is significant, i.e. it can be used to achieve an epistemic goal associated with the concept 
(sections 3.3 and 3.4). This epistemic element makes domains a hybrid ontic/epistemic cate-
gory: each individual patch describes a class of entities based on shared properties (ontic di-
mension). But the homogeneity/heterogeneity of these domains depends on which properties 
best inform our descriptions, classification systems or explanatory models (epistemic dimen-
sion). This hybrid nature explains why the domains of two patches can legitimately overlap 
without being heterogenous (section 4.1). 
Homogeneity failures often co-occur with technique failures. Consider extending the do-
main of “gold” patch (1) to clusters with less than 10.000 atoms (<10nm in size). Above this 
scale, the acid test reliably detects chemical inertness in metal samples made of gold. Below 
this scale, however, the test fails because gold nanoparticles are catalytic, i.e. they start to bind 
oxygen molecules on their surface. This change in chemical behavior can be explained by na-
noscale geometry rather than atomic orbital symmetry. At the corners of nanoparticles, the 
number of gold atom neighbors drops from nine to three or four (Hvolbæk et al. [2007], p. 16). 
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The decrease increases the likelihood of binding of oxygen and other molecules, which makes 
gold nanoparticle catalytic. Extending the domain of “gold” patch (1) to nanoparticles would 
be inadequate because researchers cannot use ‘being inert’ but instead use ‘being catalytic’ as 
the property to assign nanoparticles to the extension of “gold”. This homogeneity failure co-
occurs with reliability failures because neither the acid test nor atomic models adequately cap-
ture the catalytic behavior of gold nanoparticles. 
While often co-occurring, reliability and homogeneity failures are distinct because they 
can come apart. This happens when a technique reliably measures property θ in two entities but 
θ is only significant to describe, classify or explain the behavior of e1 but not e2.  For patch (2) 
of “cortical column”, neuroscientists use uniform functional responses to describe primary sen-
sory areas as being composed of cortical columns. In the 1970s, researchers argued to extend 
this domain to cortical barrels in rodents. Barrels are vertical structures with uniform responses 
because they isomorphically represent the cylindrical shape of the whisker hair (Horton and 
Adams [2005]). In columns, researchers can use uniform responses to describe columnar func-
tional architecture—how the vertical structures process stimulus features other than its topog-
raphy (Hubel and Wiesel [1977], p. 2). In barrels, uniform responses do not describe columnar 
functional architecture because barrels only represent sensory topography (whisker hair loca-
tion). Extending “cortical column” patch (2) to barrels would create a heterogeneous domain. 
Researchers would describe topography and not columnar functional architecture, even though 
vertical recordings reliably detect uniform responses in these structures. This example illus-
trates that the homogeneity of a domain not only depends on which entities share similar prop-





3.3 Insignificant properties 
The third way in which extending a patch can fail is when property θ becomes insignificant 
once another property ψ directs the application of a patch. Shifts of significance remain initially 
unrecognized and are ultimately beyond the control of speakers (Wilson [2006], pp. 102–4, pp. 
136–7). Consequently, scientists cannot predict a priori how extending a concept changes 
which property is significant, they can only update their semantic picture after significance 
shifts have occurred (sections 3.4 and 4.1). The failures discussed above are indicators to eval-
uate the significance of a property. A property θ is likely significant if (S1) it is the property 
detected by reliable instances of t, (S2) it can be used to assign entities in d to the concept’s 
extension and additionally, (S3) it contributes to a descriptive, classificatory or explanatory goal 
associated with the concept.4 Consequently θ is likely insignificant if it fails to meet one or 
more of (S1)–(S3). A patch targeting an insignificant property fails to generate scientific 
knowledge because scientists cannot use the property to describe, classify or explain the behav-
ior of entities falling under the concept. 
There are synchronic failures of significance: at the same stage of conceptual develop-
ment θ is significant in d1 but not in d2. For “hardness”, yield strength is significant because 
(S1) it is detected by reliable instances of indenter tests (in metals), (S2) it is used to assign 
members of the class ‘metal’ to the extension of “hardness” and (S3) it describes when metals 
endure or break under an applied load. But yield strength becomes insignificant in elastomers 
because (S1) indenter tests produce unreliable results (section 3.1), (S2) yield strength cannot 
be used to assign elastomers to the extension of “hardness” and (S3) yield strength contributes 
little to the description of elastomer behavior (Fig. 3, section 4.1).  
 
4 (S3) generalizes Brigandt’s ([2010]) proposal to include the epistemic goal into the content of a concept. Brigandt 
focuses on explanatory goals and selects one goal to justify conceptual change as rational. I emphasize that patch-
work concepts serve multiple kinds of goals (description, classification and explanation) at any point in time. 
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Synchronic significance provides an additional constraint that goes beyond the reliability 
of techniques. Scientists often use multiple techniques simultaneously to generate empirical 
knowledge about the entities they investigate (see Feest [2011], 398). But using the same tech-
nique t can hinder knowledge generation if t reliably detects a property that is only significant 
to characterize the behavior of some, but not other entities (section 3.2). Determining syn-
chronic significance restricts reliable uses of t to those entities where scientists can use θ to 
achieve their epistemic goals. In a legitimate patchwork concept, multiple techniques reliably 
detect different properties which are synchronically significant for the behavior of different 
classes of entities (section 4.1).  
There are also diachronic failures of significance, i.e. θ is significant in d1 at an earlier 
but not at a later stage of conceptual development. An example is the property ‘vertical connec-
tions > horizontal connections’ from “cortical column” patch (3). This property was initially 
evaluated as significant: it was (S1) detected by reliable instances of the best anatomical tech-
niques, and thus (S2) used to assign the class ‘vertical cell band’ to the extension of “cortical 
column” (Mountcastle [1997]). Furthermore, (S3) the property was used to explain why cells 
in a minicolumn have the same stimulus preference (Haueis [2021]). Newer quantitative anal-
yses, however, suggest that vertical connections are equal to or weaker than horizontal connec-
tions (da Costa and Martin [2010], pp. 6–7). The property ‘vertical connections > horizontal 
connections’ is thus diachronically insignificant. The actual ratio of vertical and horizontal con-
nections (S1) was not reliably detected by earlier anatomical techniques. Thus, (S2) the property 
could no longer be used to assign the class ‘vertical cell band’ to the extension of “cortical 
column”. Consequently, neuroscientists no longer refer to ‘vertical connections > horizontal 
connections’ but to other connectivity properties when attempting to (S3) explain how stimulus-
selectivity is organized at the microscale (da Costa and Martin [2010], pp. 8–9). Diachronic 




when scientists attempt to meet the epistemic goal associated with the concept to a higher de-
gree, or when they introduce novel epistemic goals (Brigandt [2010], section 3.4).  
Synchronic and diachronic failures of significance can co-occur in the same patchwork 
concept. For example: LSPR is used to classify gold nanoparticles (Muskens et al. [2008]) and 
to explain their reddish-brown colour. But LSPR fails to be synchronically significant to clas-
sify macroscopic gold lumps because it only occurs when the diameter of the particle is shorter 
than the wavelength of visible light (Bursten [2018]). In addition, atomic weight failed to be 
diachronically significant and was superseded—at least in the official reading—by nuclear 
charge as the atomic property that is used to classify gold and other elements in the periodic 
table (Hendry [2006]).  
3.4 When do patch failures necessitate novel concepts? 
Unreliable techniques, heterogeneous domains and insignificant properties indicate that scien-
tists have extended a patch beyond its proper boundaries. When do these failures require novel 
concept, rather extending a patch to a novel discovery? In this section I propose that scientists 
should form a novel concept if patch failures accumulate over time. A new concept is necessary 
if (a) a failure at time point t1 persists at t2 and (b) more failures occur at t2 than at t1. Condition 
(a) implies that individual failures are insufficient to necessitate a novel concept. In practice, 
scientists often “repair” an initially faulty patch extension, for instance by modifying an unre-
liable technique, re-carving a heterogenous domain, or continuing their search for significant 
properties. A patch extension becomes illegitimate only if the failure persists despite scientists’ 
repair efforts. Condition (b) implies that it is not necessary that all three failures co-occur to 
justify introducing a new concept. Researchers often judge a patch extension as faulty if further 
failures accrue, and despite the fact that particular norm remains fulfilled. 
Consider the following cases of how cumulative patch failures necessitate novel concepts: 
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(A) In 1967, molecular biologists proposed a novel kind of homology–“sequence homology” 
–based on the degree of DNA similarity between chromosomes (Neurath et al. ([1967]).  
 
(B) In the 1970s, some neuroscientists used physiological and anatomical similarities to pre-
vious cases to assign cortical barrels to the extension of “cortical column” (section 3.2). 
 
(C) In 1750s, some chemists used similarities between gold and platinum to call the latter 
“white gold” (Ebbs [2003], 254). 
 
 
In (A), researchers initially favored extending “homology” to sequence similarity because 
it was significant to explain Mendelian inheritance patterns (Egel [2000]). In 1987, however, a 
number of prominent biologists rejected “sequence homology” (Reeck et al. [1987]). This ex-
tension (a) involved a technique which persistently failed to distinguish genealogical from 
nongenealogical forms of homology (Saap [2009], p. 227). Also, (b) DNA similarity failed to 
be significant to reconstruct the phylogeny of organisms (Reeck et al. [1987]). Persistent relia-
bility failure, combined with significance failure, thus led biologists to distinguish DNA simi-
larity from “homology”.5 
In (B), neuroscientists extended “cortical column” to cortical barrels because their dis-
crete anatomical boundaries were significant to achieve the goal of describing discrete building 
blocks in the neocortex. Researchers accepted this extension despite domain heterogeneity (sec-
tion 3.2). However, neuroscientists subsequently formed the concept “cortical isomorph” to 
describe structures which represent the topography of a body part (Catania [2002]). This con-
cept is necessary because (a) domain heterogeneity persisted as neuroscientists discovered more 
cortical isomorphs without columnar functional architecture (Horton and Adams [2005]). Also 
(b) discrete barrel boundaries turned out diachronically insignificant, as neuroscientists no 
longer used “cortical column” to describe anatomically discrete building blocks (Haueis 
[2021]). Persistent homogeneity failure, together with significance failure explains why neuro-
scientists rejected the barrel extension as illegitimate. 
 




 Finally, (C) conceptualizing platinum as “white gold” was reasonable at first because the 
acid test (“gold” patch (1)) reliably dissolves samples of gold and platinum (Ebbs [2003], p. 
254). The subsequent discovery of atomic properties by analytic chemistry, however, revealed 
that “white gold” (a) involves a technique which does not reliably distinguish atomic properties 
of different noble metals. It also (b) creates a heterogenous domain of chemical entities, which 
fails to achieve the goal of explaining differences in macroscale chemical behavior in terms of 
differences in lower-scale properties (Bursten [2018]).6 In response to this cumulative failure, 
chemists formed the element name “platinum” and abandoned “white gold”. 
The examples above show that cumulative failure occurs over extended periods of time. 
This explains why in ongoing practice, it is partially indeterminate whether a patch extension 
is legitimate or whether a novel concept is necessary. In (A)–(C), scientists initially had good 
reasons to extend existing patches: at the time of discovery, they involved reliable techniques 
(white gold) or picked out significant properties (cortical barrels, sequence homology). But the 
legitimacy of these extensions depends on future research. Further experimentation and theo-
rizing determines whether individual failures persist, or if the fulfilment of norms needs to be 
re-evaluated. Future research also determines if patch extensions meet or fail norms whose ful-
filment was unknown to scientists at the time of discovery. For example: researchers initially 
did not know if “sequence homology” or “white gold” results in domain heterogeneity or not. 
In ongoing research, it is partially indeterminate whether novel discoveries require broadening 
or narrowing the extension of a patchwork concept (Ebbs [2003], p. 252; Feest [2010], p. 183). 
This partial indeterminacy distinguishes the generalized patchwork approach from exter-
nalist semantics. Externalists assume that the extension of kind terms is determined by an os-
tensive definition and the property present when speakers introduced the term via the definition 
 
6 In this case reliability failure is retroactively determined as persistent after researchers re-evaluated the technique 
after discovering atomic differences between platinum and gold. This supports the claim that cumulative patch 
failure depends on future research (see below). 
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(Ebbs [2003], p. 253). This property controls concept application (Nimtz [2018], p. 8). By con-
trast, the general reasoning strategy of a patchwork concept instructs researchers how to use 
techniques to search for properties in a domain of entities. But these strategies only describe 
how researchers extend patchwork concepts. They do not tell us which extension is legitimate. 
For this, researchers need to ask if the techniques used to realize the strategy are reliable, the 
domain to which the strategy is extended is homogenous, and whether the properties targeted 
are epistemically significant (section 4.1). Contra externalism, properties alone do not control 
the application of a patchwork concept since significance changes both synchronically and di-
achronically (section 3.3). We can thus only retrospectively, but not prospectively determine if 
extending a patch to a novel case is legitimate or whether it will accrue failures, which requires 
a novel concept. 
More can be said about the relation between patchwork concepts, externalism and nor-
mativity (see Rouse [2014]). For now, I assume that cumulative failures can be used to retro-
spectively evaluate when extending a patch is illegitimate. This motivates the proposal that 
legitimate uses of a patchwork concept avoid these failures.   
 
4.  The legitimacy of patchwork concepts 
4.1 Normative constraints on using polysemous scientific concepts 
Combining the three kinds of patch failure reveals normative constraints which scientists follow 
to use terms with multiple related meanings rigorously and without equivocation. First, scien-
tists switch techniques to keep producing reliable results when extending the same word to 
novel cases. When extending “hardness” from metals to elastic or brittle materials, material 
scientists switch from indenter to durometer or abrasion tests (Fig. 1). Similarly, when extend-




enhancement/knockout techniques to phylogenetic tree comparison (section 3.1). Neuroscien-
tists and chemists similarly switch techniques to reliably detect scale-dependent properties 
grouped under “cortical column” and “gold”. This reliability constraint keeps scientists from 
stretching techniques beyond their proper application range. 
Second, scientists split the application domain of a patchwork concept into multiple ho-
mogenous domains based on which property θ is most informative to describe, classify or ex-
plain the behavior of a class of entities. Material scientists split the application domain of “hard-
ness” into the domains of elastomers, metals and technical ceramics because different properties 
are significant to describe their behavior. Similarly, biologists split “homology” into different 
domains based on which particular mechanism is significant to explain the sameness of genes 
or of body parts. To describe the functional architecture of the cortex, neuroscientists split the 
domain of “cortical column” into columnar, hypercolumnar and minicolumnar domains. And 
to classify scale-dependent properties of gold, chemists split the application domain of “gold” 
into the homogenous domains of chemically inert macroscale lumps, catalytic nanoparticles 
and isolated gold atoms. This homogeneity constraint is crucial to avoid lumping multiple dis-
tinct phenomena into one domain and splitting instances of the same phenomenon across mul-
tiple domains (Craver [2007], pp. 123–4).  
Third, scientists update their semantic picture to capture which properties different 
patches refer to, and why these properties are significant to reach an epistemic goal. For exam-
ple: material scientists tried and failed to develop a notion of “absolute hardness” which iden-
tifies hardness with a single physical quantity like yield strength (Williams [1942]). In contrast, 
what has proven immensely successful are material property charts, which describe the relation 
between multiple different quantities of “hardness”: 




Fig. 3 Relationship of Young’s modulus of elasticity measured in Gigapascal and strength measured in 
Megapascal for different kinds of material (coloured circles). Chart from CES EduPack 2010, Granta 
Design Limited, Cambridge, UK, 2010. 
Fig. 3 represents parts of the semantic picture of “hardness”. It displays how strength and elas-
ticity are distributed in different classes of material. This semantic picture of “hardness” ac-
counts for how material scientists use “hardness” when designing safe steel bridges, flexible 
strings or anti-scratch glass. Rather than univocally referring to the same property of hardness 
in all materials, “hardness” partially refers to more than one physical quantity (Field 1973, p. 
475; Stanford and Kitcher [2000], p. 119). These quantities best account for the behavior of 
restricted classes of material that matter for engineering purposes. The significance constraint 
thus ensures that scientists avoid semantic pictures which correlate concepts with properties 




Legitimate patchwork concepts acquire multiple meanings because scientists switch tech-
niques, split domains and update semantic pictures in their attempt to meet the reliability, ho-
mogeneity and significance constraints on individual patches. These normative constraints also 
explain when scientists can legitimately relate multiple patches to one another to achieve their 
epistemic goals in scientific practice. This epistemic role of legitimate relations is part of the 
pragmatic unity of patchwork concepts overlooked by eliminativists (section 4.2). First, the 
reliability constraint allows scientists to reuse a technique across patches. Biologists reuse phy-
logenetic methods across “homology” patches (1), (2) and (3), because they can be used to 
reliably detect orthologs and paralogs, and under certain conditions also xenologs (Altenhoff, 
Glover and Dessimoz [2019], Ravenhall et al. [2015]). Neuroscientists reuse tangential record-
ings across “cortical column” patches (1) and (2). In some areas, they reliably detect functional 
boundaries between columns (by showing where neuronal responses shift across the cortex) 
and whether uniform responses of multiple columns are sequence regular (by showing that they 
shift in an orderly manner, Hubel and Wiesel [1977], pp. 24–5). By reusing techniques across 
patches, researchers connect multiple domain-specific, scale-dependent and property-targeting 
uses of a concept into a larger patchwork structure. 
Second, the homogeneity constraint allows that two patches have overlapping domains. 
An overlap region O is legitimate if θ from d1 or ψ from d2 can be used equivalently to assign 
entities in O to the extension of a concept. For example: the overlap region of “hardness” 
patches (1) and (2) is the class of polyamides, which tells material scientists that indenter and 
durometer tests produce convergent results for materials like nylon. This convergence allows 
them to use yield strength or Young’s modulus of elasticity equivalently to assign nylon to the 
extension of “hardness”. It also tells them something about the world, i.e. that polyamides com-
bine the elasticity of rubbers with the strength of metals (Fig. 3). Similarly, the overlap region 
of “homology” patches (1) and (4) is the class of genealogical homologs, which tells biologists 
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that certain kinds of genes and body parts transform into one another on an evolutionary time-
scale. This fact is important to integrate knowledge about homology from phylogenetics, com-
parative anatomy and developmental genetics (McCune and Shimenti [2012]). By letting 
patches intersect where domains legitimately overlap, scientists create patchwork structures 
which are not only of theoretical and experimental importance, but also informative about the 
structure of the world. 
Finally, the significance constraint allows that scientists combine properties from several 
patches to achieve epistemic goals of a concept. One pertinent example is multiscale modeling, 
where researchers link multiple scale-dependent uses of a concept together to describe, classify 
or explain the behavior of an entity (Batterman [2013], Wilson [2017], ch. 5). Consider the 
famous ‘ice-cube model’ (Hubel and Wiesel [1977]):  
 
Fig. 4: Ice cube model of the primary visual cortex. Adopted from Horton and Adams ([2005]).  
This model combines “cortical column” patches (1)–(3) to describe primary visual cortex as 
composed of orientation columns (minicolumn scale) that are sequence regular (hypercolumn 
scale), and which orthogonally intersect with two ocular dominance columns (column scale). 




neocortex until researchers re-evaluated the significance of minicolumnar properties and up-
dated their semantic picture of “cortical column” (sections 3.3 and 4.2). Another instance of 
combining scale-dependent properties are scale-bridging explanations (Bursten [2018]). For 
example, electronic symmetry (atomic scale) is significant to explain the chemical inertness of 
macroscale gold lumps (Hvolbæk et al. [2007], p. 15). When explaining the reactivity of nano-
particles, however, researchers emphasize molecular geometry rather than electronic symmetry. 
This example suggests that a conceptual patchwork structure provides multiple ways to com-
bine properties in scale-bridging explanations, without any single property being equally sig-
nificant in all explanatory contexts. 
In sum, we can evaluate the legitimacy of a patchwork concept by asking whether (i) the 
techniques, domains and properties of individual patches fulfil the reliability, homogeneity and 
significance constraint and whether (ii) multiple patches are related via the reuse of reliable 
techniques, the intersection of legitimately overlapping domains and the combination of signif-
icant properties in multiscale modeling or scale-bridging explanations. 
 
4.2 Meeting the eliminativist challenge to polysemy 
The normative constraints on legitimate patches and their relations now allow us to address the 
eliminativist challenge to polysemy in science. I focus on Taylor and Vickers ([2017]) because 
they agree with previous case studies that the formation of patchwork concepts is a ubiquitous 
and perhaps inevitable feature of scientific development. Yet, they deny the normative conclu-
sion that we “should continue to use the original term in our investigations” (Taylor and Vick-
ers, p. 20). Under certain circumstances, scientists should get rid of the superordinate patchwork 
concept and only use the precisely defined patches. Patchwork concepts like “hardness” should 
be selectively eliminated:  
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In a context in materials science where the differences between the [patches] really matter, there 
is just no point to using the word ‘hard’–it does not communicate enough to help. And there is a 
danger that different interlocutors will interpret ‘hard’ in different ways and miscommunicate. 
Further, one just does not need the word ‘hard’ to communicate about materials – quite clearly, 
one can say everything one wants to say about materials using other terms such as [“yield 
strength”, “Young’s modulus” or “wear rate”] (Taylor and Vickers [2017], p. 33). 
The generalized patchwork approach agrees with selective eliminativism that the word ‘hard’ 
does not itself encode specific information about material behavior. That work is done by 
patches specifying which technique is reliable to apply “hardness” to a homogenous domain of 
entities with the same significant property. So, my first response is if each patch is properly 
normatively constrained, then there is no issue with using the polysemous word in scientific 
practice. This seems to be the case for “hardness” and also—to a large extent—for the other 
examples. 
Eliminativists will reply that there are risks associated with keeping the superordinate 
polysemous term (Taylor and Vickers [2017], 28f.). First, the more theoretical roles (i.e. epis-
temic goals) a term is used for, the more different meanings it acquires and thus the greater the 
risk of miscommunication becomes. Second, if the concept is pivotal to reach the conclusion of 
an argument, there is a risk of pointless debate that rests on different understandings of the term.  
Regarding miscommunication, Taylor and Vickers ([2017], p. 32) do point to linguistic 
work on polysemy, but do not mention the observation that polysemous words rarely pose a 
problem for successful everyday communication (Taylor [2003], p. 647; Falkum [2015], p. 84). 
Similarly, polysemous patchwork concepts need not increase the risk of miscommunication 
among scientists trained to use them in a context-sensitive manner. For “hardness”, researchers 
learn how to use hardness tests within their proper application range (reliability constraint), and 




classes of material behave (homogeneity and significance constraint). These charts illustrate 
why polysemy is not eliminated by talking directly about patches. The general quantity of 
strength, for example, refers to one of four specific quantities depending on the material (Fig. 
3, upper left corner). Researchers retain superordinate terms like “strength” or “hardness” to 
convey that these quantities are related to one another. These local relations are crucial to 
achieve the epistemic goals of a concept.  
Besides local relations, there is a general reasoning strategy for each patchwork concept. 
Together, the relations and the reasoning strategy integrate different patches, which gives patch-
work concepts a pragmatic unity. Two patches “P1” < t1, d1 (θ) > and “P2” < t2, d2 (ψ) > are 
integrated if 
(i) t1 and t2 realize the same general reasoning strategy 
(ii) t1 can be re-used to reliably detect some instances of ψ or t2 can be re-used to reliably detect 
some instances of θ 
(iii) there is a legitimate overlap region O between d1 and d2 
(iv) θ and ψ can be combined to achieve an epistemic goal associated with the patchwork concept 
Condition (i) ensures that two technique-involving uses are patches of the same patchwork con-
cept because they implement the stepwise instructions of the same general reasoning strategy. 
Conditions (ii)–(iv) specify the extent of integration by ensuring that the local relations between 
patches respect the normative constraints on each related patch. For example: “hardness” 
patches (1)–(3) are integrated. Each hardness test (i) realizes the same reasoning strategy be-
cause it (a) mechanically intervenes on a material and (b) quantifies the material’s resistance to 
this intervention (section 2.1). Additionally, (iii) indenter and durometer patches legitimately 
overlap for polyamides, and (iv) material property charts combine multiple hardness quantities 
to describe the behavior of different classes of material. Selective eliminativism overlooks the 
extent to which multiple patches of a polysemous patchwork concept are integrated. The 
strength of the generalized patchwork approach is that it explains how this pragmatic unity 
emerges from the epistemic practices of scientists being responsive to the world. It does so 
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parsimoniously, without the need of positing any semantic or metaphysical unifier (a core 
meaning or essential property). And for “hardness” and analogous concepts we have reasons to 
suspect that there indeed is no such unifier. 
Regarding pointless debate, Taylor and Vickers vacillate between scientific and philo-
sophical debates about a concept. If they mean scientific debates, they provide no evidence that 
material scientists engage in pointless debates about “hardness” which justify eliminating the 
term. My approach suggests that researchers avoid pointless debates by following the reliabil-
ity, homogeneity and significance constraint when using “hardness”. If Taylor and Vickers 
mean philosophical debates, then the patchwork approach shows that philosophical confusions 
can arise from a faulty semantic picture of the reference of the polysemous concept. For exam-
ple: Descartes’ and Reid’s debate about the subjective or objective nature of hardness dissolves 
once we recognize the patchwork of tests used to probe the resistance of a material, both in 
everyday life and science (Wilson [2006], p. 335). Pointless debates can be avoided by updating 
our semantic picture of a patchwork concept without eliminating that concept. The success of 
material property charts in reflecting the worldly correlates of “hardness” suggests that adequate 
semantic pictures play an important role in science. Philosophers of science can contribute to 
this role by articulating better semantic pictures of patchwork concepts (Haueis [2018], [2020], 
Burnston and Haueis [2021], Novick and Doolittle [2021]).  
Taylor and Vickers may admit that relations between patches and semantic pictures are 
important but insist on selective elimination when polysemy does lead to miscommunication 
and pointless debate. The concept “cortical column” in neuroscience seems to exemplify this 
situation:  it has multiple different meanings which can lead to miscommunication and which 
affect the debate about the functional significance of columns. A patchwork approach, however, 
shows that that elimination of “cortical column” is not necessary (Haueis [2021]). First, as 




can be very confusing to the non-specialist”. Like in the “hardness” case, it is unclear why 
miscommunication should really affect neuroscientific experts trained to use the term in a scale-
dependent, technique-involving, domain-specific and property-targeting manner. 
 Second, neuroscientists resolved the debate about functional significance by updating 
their semantic picture of “cortical column”. According to the ‘building block picture’, “cortical 
column” refers to a module that processes information in the same way in every cortical area. 
Subsequent discoveries, however, showed that not all areas have a columnar architecture, and 
that scale-dependent columnar properties occur independently or are insignificant. In response 
to these discoveries, researchers now hold that “cortical column” refers to different kinds of 
scale- and area-specific columnar structures. When neuroscientists criticize that the column is 
a “structure without a function” (Horton and Adams [2005], p. 837), they target the old building 
block picture of “cortical column”. This picture entails that columns are the basic functional 
entity of the cortex. The new semantic picture, however, acknowledges that some columnar 
structures are functional whereas others are not. So “cortical column” does not refer to a basic 
functional entity, but partially refers to different columnar structures of variable functional sig-
nificance. Researchers should keep “cortical column” to understand how knowledge about these 
structures can or cannot be combined to achieve epistemic goals (Haueis [2021]). Rather than 
being pointless, this debate shows that it is crucial to determine which semantic picture of a 
concepts’ reference accords with the empirical facts and which one does not. 
My response to the eliminativist challenge does not reflect deep disagreements with Tay-
lor and Vickers but rather differences in emphasis. While focusing on the danger of verbal 
disputes and miscommunication, eliminativists can (and should) acknowledge that relations be-
tween patches are often crucial to achieve epistemic goals (see Hampton [2010], Machery 
[2010], 238, Pérez Carballo [2020], p. 24). And while focusing on the merits of linking patches 
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together, patchwork approaches do (and should) acknowledge the importance of dissolving 
philosophical debates that rest on confusions about the meaning of a concept.  
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, I defended the legitimacy of polysemous concepts in science, in part, by introduc-
ing a generalized patchwork approach to scientific concepts. Patchwork concepts are character-
ized by multiple patches, i.e. scale-dependent, technique-involving, domain-specific and prop-
erty-targeting uses of a word. Yet, there is no core meaning to which all these uses are related. 
Individual patches are legitimate if they involve reliable techniques, are applied to homogenous 
domains, and refer to properties which are significant to describe, classify or explain the behav-
ior of entities in the domain. To reach these epistemic goals, researchers relate multiple patches 
of a concept by reusing techniques across patches, letting domains legitimately overlap and 
combining scale-dependent properties in multiscale models or scale-bridging explanations. To-
gether with a general reasoning strategy, these normatively constrained local relations integrate 
patches to give patchwork concepts a pragmatic form of unity. The general structure of patch-
work concepts shows how scientists maintain seemingly equivocal uses of the same scientific 
term without eliminating the legitimate patchwork concept of which they are instances.  Re-
searchers avoid miscommunication by following the reliability, homogeneity and significance 
constraints, and they can dissolve pointless debates by articulating better semantic pictures of 
what a patchwork concept refers to.  
The normativity of the generalized patchwork approach makes it a potential alternative 
to theories of scientific concepts which posit a unifier that underlies conceptual variation. I 
already mentioned natural kind essentialism, which posits an essential property that unifies dif-
ferent uses of a natural kind term like “gold” (Nimtz [2018]). Similarly, semantic holism posits 
a unifier because it holds that the meaning of a concept like “force” is determined by its relation 




scientists could violate normative constraints if they follow essentialist or holist principles. For 
example, concerning “gold”, Nimtz ([2018], p.15) claims that the atomic property of ‘being 
Au’ is the pivotal explanatory property which explains why “paradigmatic samples of gold ex-
hibit compellingly many of those characteristics chemistry itself deems most relevant”. But 
singling out ‘being Au’ as the only pivotal explanatory property may violate the significance 
constraint: whereas atomic properties are most relevant to explain the inertness of macroscopic 
gold lumps, molecular geometry is most relevant to explain the reactivity of gold nanoparticles.  
Semantic holists like Andreas ([2010]) claim that the method of determining the extension 
of “force” involves F=ma as a theoretical axiom. One may worry that singling out F=ma as the 
only fundamental equation violates the reliability constraint. In fact, physicists combine many 
different modeling techniques to reliably calculate the forces acting on an object. For billiard 
ball collisions, standard Newtonian techniques become unreliable once high-impact velocities 
plastically deform the balls. Physicists switch to continuum mechanics to calculate the impact 
of internal stress waves, or to laminate modeling to calculate interfacial forces when the balls 
crack internally after impact. Thus “force” seems a patchwork concept which partially refers to 
different scale-dependent behaviors described in a multiscale modeling schema (Wilson [2006], 
pp. 180–3; [2017], p. 38, pp. 339–40).  
Further work is needed to compare the generalized patchwork approach to these and other 
theories of scientific concepts. But if the normative constraints developed here can be fruitfully 
applied to paradigmatic cases of such theories, then the patchwork approach provides a genuine 
alternative of how concepts can be structured in our best scientific practices. 
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